Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System
What it means
CISA Cybersecurity Advisories ha pubblicato un advisory sul ransomware Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System. La fonte descrive vulnerabilita o tecniche gia osservate in attacchi e richiede una verifica prioritaria.
Why it matters
L'advisory descrive attivita ransomware osservate e misure difensive pubblicate da un'autorita. Non prova che il proprio perimetro sia compromesso, ma richiede una verifica prioritaria di esposizione e controlli.
Recommended actions
- Verificare e correggere con priorita i sistemi Internet-facing indicati dalla fonte; applicare MFA resistente al phishing, segmentazione e backup offline immutabili con prove di ripristino.
- Verificare sistemi esposti, accessi remoti e versioni rispetto all'advisory ufficiale.
- Confermare che backup offline e immutabili siano separati e ripristinabili.
- Correlare TTP e IOC pubblicati con la telemetria autorizzata del proprio perimetro.
Potential operational benefits
- Prioritizzazione delle esposizioni Internet e delle vulnerabilita sfruttate
- Verifica dei controlli su accessi remoti, movimento laterale ed esfiltrazione
- Validazione documentata della capacita di ripristino
Translation in progress
The official content is available in the original language. The Italian version will be published once automated checks are complete.
Text acquired from the source
Cybersecurity Advisory Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System Last Revised September 03, 2025 Alert Code AA25-239A CISA Product Feedback Survey Related topics: Cybersecurity Best Practices , Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Executive summary People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actors are targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks. While these actors focus on large backbone routers of major telecommunications providers, as well as provider edge (PE) and customer edge (CE) routers, they also leverage compromised devices and trusted connections to pivot into other networks. These actors often modify routers to maintain persistent, long-term access to networks. This activity partially overlaps with cyber threat actor reporting by the cybersecurity industry—commonly referred to as Salt Typhoon, OPERATOR PANDA, RedMike, UNC5807, and GhostEmperor, among others. The authoring agencies are not adopting a particular commercial naming convention and hereafter refer to those responsible for the cyber threat activity more generically as “Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors” throughout this advisory. This cluster of cyber threat activity has been observed in the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and other areas globally. This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) includes observations from various government and industry investigations where the APT actors targeted internal enterprise environments, as well as systems and networks that deliver services directly to customers. This CSA details the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) lev
Indicatori CISA verificabili
0 valori IOC dalla fonte ufficiale. Non sono una lista di blocco automatica: verificare data, contesto e applicabilita.
Ultima verifica: 2026-09-26T06:00:37.119677+00:00
Questo allegato contiene 88 indicatori incompleti o non interpretabili, conservati nell'originale ma esclusi dall'export operativo. I valori mancanti non sono stati dedotti.
| Tipo | Indicatore (non cliccabile) | File |
|---|
Provenance
Allegato ufficiale CISA · 2025-09-04T11:12:27Z
SHA-512: 8447009f2e0d16ae0e759811510a18f824e1aae29d1841d85d919ffc7d558796484b3021f5837b6bd6fb38657bd3919c5c359e99b95558562019ad45ec299d44
- Source
- CISA Cybersecurity Advisories
- Publishing entity
- CISA
- Entity type
- National authority
- Area
- North America · US
- Original language
- en · translation in preparation
- Publication
- 03/09/2025 14:00
- Sharing
- TLP:CLEAR
- MITRE ATT&CK
- T1003, T1005, T1016, T1021, T1021.004, T1027, T1027.010, T1040, T1048.003, T1059.006, T1059.008, T1068, T1070, T1070.009, T1071, T1082, T1090, T1090.003, T1095, T1098.004, T1110.002, T1136.001, T1190, T1199, T1543.005, T1556, T1560, T1562.004, T1569, T1571, T1572, T1583.003, T1584.008, T1588.002, T1588.005, T1590.004, T1595, T1599, T1602.001, T1602.002, T1609, T1610
- CVE
- CVE-2024-21887, CVE-2023-46805, CVE-2024-3400, CVE-2023-20273, CVE-2023-20198, CVE-2018-0171
- Classification
- Critical
- Stated country
- US
Affected products and versions
The collector will check NVD and the available official vendor advisories.
Action indicated by the source
Verificare e correggere con priorita i sistemi Internet-facing indicati dalla fonte; applicare MFA resistente al phishing, segmentazione e backup offline immutabili con prove di ripristino.
Official technical references
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/AA25-239A_Countering_Chinese_State-Sponsored_Actors_Compromise_of_Networks_Worldwide_to_Feed_Global_Espionage_System.stix_.json
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-09/AA25-239A_Countering_Chinese_State-Sponsored_Actors_Compromise_of_Networks_Worldwide_to_Feed_Global_Espionage_System.stix_.xml
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/joint-guidance-enhanced-visibility-hardening-guide-for-comms-infrastructure-508c_0.pdf
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/guidance-mobile-communications-best-practices.pdf